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REFEUDALIZATION
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ABSTRACT After clarifying the conceptual frame, the author describes and 
interprets the refeudalizing tendencies of global capitalism in the first part of the 
study. The subject of the second part is an exploration of the refeudalizing processes 
in Hungary from the period of “existing socialism” to the present day. She concludes 
about the global system that the refeudalizing processes are immanent features of 
new capitalism, which come about as the wildings of unbridled capitalism on the 
one hand, and in defense against them, on the other. 
Concerning the Hungarian processes, the author’s main conclusion is that the 
tendencies of refeudalization strengthen when – in addition to internal causes – 
the semi-peripheral “system” exposed to global processes faces a strong external 
challenge. This challenge involves a radical change in the geopolitical, geo-
economic equilibrium, entailing more marked feudalistic, authoritarian endeavors.
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A Wikipedia article claims that refeudalization is a notion that was used 
to describe seventeenth-century social trends. The Italian Marxist historians 
Ruggiero Romano and Rosario Villari were the first to apply it in their effort 
to explore the social relations underlying the Neapolitan Revolt of 1647. The 
concept was influenced by Gramsci’s ideas, the historical debates of the 1960s 
centering on Eric Hobsbawm’s thesis of the general crisis of the seventeenth 
century, and by Italian domestic politics of the 1960s.
Villari specifically used the term to characterize the process that climaxed 
in the revolt of the peasantry and the lower middle classes against the feudal 
aristocracy and international financiers in Naples in 1647. In Ferdinand Braudel’s 
words, Naples displayed the “clearest case” of refeudalization: the kingdom sold 
feudal titles for money, which in the long run increased the tax burdens of the 
rural poor, for the nobility were exempt from paying taxes.
In general, the process of refeudalization is blamed for the delay and failure of 
Italy’s transition to capitalism.
Last, but not least, the concept of refeudalization is also used – first of all 
by sociologists – to describe contemporary global economic and cultural 
processes. In Habermas’ view, the structure of the public sphere has been re-
feudalized and the feudal “court” revived due to the advent of the most recent 
manifestation of capitalism. The Swiss sociologist Jean Ziegler used the phrase 
“Refeudalisierung der Gesellschaft” in his explanation of the driving forces 
of neoliberalist globalization. In English literature, the phenomenon is mainly 
termed New Feudalization, meaning the undermining of the basic values of the 
Enlightenment (liberty, equality, fraternity) by the forces of global capitalism. 
The term is also used in interpretations of the radical privatization of public 
goods and services.
In the longer, first part of this paper I adopt the latter course, providing a 
specific interpretation of the refeudalizing tendencies of global capitalism. This 
is preceded by a chapter that clarifies the basic concepts as I understand them. 
In the third part of the study I explore the new feudalistic tendencies in Hungary 
from socialist times to the present day.
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAME
I start out from the work of Marx, Weber and Elias for the definitions of the 
concepts I use in my analysis, but the latter are not directly derived from them.
First of all, the basic relations of feudalism, capitalism and existing socialism 
must be differentiated from various phenomena at the ideotypical level: these 
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are the dominant social relations; what the main objectives of social, specifically 
productive activity are; which group constitutes the dominant fraction of the 
structure of power; and, not least, what mechanism is instrumental in integrating 
society (and according to what logic), and what the core of the ruling ideology is.
It is an important part of the process of conceptualization from another but 
related viewpoint that in describing given social formations and their mobility 
(that is, stepping beyond ideotypical considerations) we should distinguish 
feudalism from societies that display feudalistic characteristics, capitalism from 
societies that have capitalistic traits, and socialism from social formations with 
some socialistic features.
When it comes to “existing socialism”, I confine myself to a description of the 
Hungarian version from around the mid-1960s. In this chapter, only the concepts 
of socialism of an ideal or ideotypical nature, free from the totality of realistic 
elements – or rather, as they existed in communist ideologies – are described.
--
In feudalism the dominant relation is between lord and servant, in capitalism 
between capital and laborer, in socialism between the controller and the 
controlled.
The dominant goal of social, specifically productive activity is to satisfy 
authority and the power privilege in feudalism, the need for profit in capitalism, 
and social needs – not fully but in proportion to the work that is done – in 
socialism.
The dominant group exercising power in society is the ruling estate in 
feudalism. By estate I mean a group cemented by a common ethos, value 
system, behavioral pattern and lifestyle, as well as a network of formal and 
informal connections and bargains. At the head of the ruling estate is the king 
with traditional power, or a leader with charismatic power.
In capitalism the dominant fraction of power is constituted by the economic 
elite or bourgeoisie. In socialism, the power is in the hands of the people; first of 
all, the working class.
The dominant logic of feudalism is utility measured by authority and power 
privileges, and society is fundamentally integrated by their exchange and 
the underlying system of bargains. At the center of the dominant ideology is 
adaptation to ‘superior’ powers such as church, king, overlord, vassals, etc.
The dominant logic of capitalism is efficiency translated into monetary and 
profit-related terms; consequently, the main integrating force of society is the 
market and the web of market bargains. The dominant element of the ruling 
ideology of the former is free competition based on individual egoism, for, as 
Adam Smith (1922) concluded, it is the only social mechanism that promotes 
the common good.
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The ruling logic of socialism is the principle of utility measured by the 
satisfaction of needs in proportion to work that is rendered; the main integrating 
mechanism of society is a system of planned indicators and planned bargains. 
The core of the ruling ideology is the ideal of collectivism superseding individual 
egoism.
THE REFEUDALIZATION  
OF GLOBAL NEW CAPITALISM
As I have explicated in detail in my book New Capitalism – and What Can 
Replace It… it is an inherent trait of the new capitalism that unfolded in the wake 
of the neoliberalist wave starting in the 1970s that increasingly concentrated and 
internationalized capital is deconstructing the political, economic, ecological 
and socio-psychological constraints that earlier ensured its comparatively 
smooth realization. By subjecting the political elites, including the governments 
of the nation states under its domination, more inexorably than ever, it reduces 
to mere forms – or ignores the essential elements of – political rotation and 
political democracy; also, it makes the implementation of national economic 
policies, and the regulation of international cooperation between countries and 
regions, impossible.
Concentrating and globalizing capital is roaming the world practically tax-
free: this is why there has been a decrease in the resources available for the 
reproduction of human capital (health, education, culture, etc.) except for a very 
narrow segment of the workforce that works with peak technologies – although 
the leading ideologues of the system speak of a knowledge-based society. 
Yielding to the pressure of capital, trade unions crumble and hence there is 
no effective obstacle to wage depression, particularly of less qualified labor. In 
addition to Marx’s basic thesis, in new capitalism in general – particularly at its 
periphery and semi-periphery – the incomes of a broad strata of labor do not 
cover the costs of the reproduction of their manpower (in detail, see Artner 2001, 
2014), although life expectancy – taking its mean – is rising. A fatal consequence 
of all this for the bourgeoisie, too, is the degradation of human capital and the 
lack of a workforce with adequate expertise and performance – even in the 
core countries. Although the rise in life expectancy may be referred to here 
(although in the USA this decreased in 2014 after rising for the previous 20 
years [MTI 08.12.2017]), together with measurable growth in average schooling 
(with the reservation that real knowledge levels and cooperative behavior do not 
necessarily increase with more time spent in education, as international research 
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experience has found; and what is more, in large social groups the correlation is 
the reverse [Csapó, 2008]), the incidence of diverse psychic and psychosomatic 
illnesses is increasing in relation to the stress caused by the “flexibilization” of 
the labor force – and this in turn reduces the profit producing capacity of such 
labor (see in detail Szalai 2012).  Since capital replaces  a far larger part of labor 
with machines than it creates new jobs, the number of redundant, ‘unnecessary’ 
people is growing throughout the world, whose mental and physical decline will 
gradually reach a level at which they can no longer be employed.
The expansion of global capital is irreversibly exploiting our natural resources 
and destabilizing our climate. This jeopardizes not only the basic relations of 
capitalism, but also the basic conditions of nature and human life on Earth.
The logic of capital – utility measured by profit – has become predominant 
in nearly all spheres of social life – this fact is expressed by Bourdieu’s (1983) 
theory of capital, meaning that in the new phase of capitalism not only physical 
and monetary goods but also social-political and cultural goods function as 
capital.  In connection with this, the immoderate pursuit of individual freedom 
is reducing real communities to naught, as a result of which individuals become 
incapable of constructing their identity – identities – for lack of reference points: 
this risks their freedom. Although in the short run individuals deprived of their 
identities are most easily persuaded to consume, the weakening of individual 
freedom threatens the creativity of the work force and may considerably 
undermine the conditions of the profitability of capital or capitals in the long 
run.
--
Let us take a closer look at new capitalism using the definitions of different 
features of social-economic formations.
The dominant relation in new capitalism is capital-versus-labor relations, but 
the tendency for this to become interlaced and partly veiled by lord-servant 
relations is increasing: the relation of capital versus labor is not articulated. 
Firstly, because the former working class who are in opposition to capital 
have become disrupted for various reasons, and are constantly fragmenting. 
This is occurring in part due to the replacement of large factories by the net-
like organization of capital in core countries in which formerly comparatively 
stable positions and collectives of labor cease to exist: individual workers must 
remain alert to learning when and for how long their work is needed. Labor 
market positions are temporary, as manifest in the rapid spread of part-time and 
telework jobs. Added to this is the increase in unemployment; the expansion of 
the reserve troops of the jobless across the world owing to an increase in the 
organic composition of capital (“machine replaces man”). These two factors 
place individual employees completely at the mercy of individual employers 
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(where these are still visible – I will return to this later) and result in paternalist 
relationships between the two agents: the worker is grateful to the employer, 
and conversely, the employer expects loyalty from the employee (Szalai 2011, 
2012). This erodes worker solidarity, and even turns employees on each other: 
the earlier class consciousness dissolves, class resistance disappears.
The free contract between capitalist and worker – perhaps the most 
characteristic feature of capitalism – becomes mostly illusory: a worker becomes 
employed as the outcome of numerous constraints, instead of through their own 
free will and choice.
Apart from workers, capitalists also become increasingly invisible: 
proprietary structures are transforming so that classic private property accounts 
for at most 20-30 % of all wealth while corporate ownership is increasing 
rapidly, particularly the networks of large institutional investments. The actual 
proprietary relations behind these networks may only be explored through the 
very complex procedures of the courts of registration (Pitti 2006).
Another important factor in the invisibility of the capitalist is that in new 
capitalism the bourgeoisie almost totally expropriate nation-states, which also 
means that they tap working income from time to time through the collaboration of 
national governments, instead of doing so directly. This is a characteristic feature 
of the former: one of the most essential elements of neoliberal economic policy 
specific to new capitalism is restrictive policy that narrows down the domestic 
markets of nation states, the most direct aim and at the same time instrument of 
which is the modification of wages and welfare expenditure. This situation was 
particularly conspicuous – together with the level of interest of the global and local 
bourgeoisie – in the management of the 2008 crisis: after the outbreak of the crisis, 
national governments sacrificed considerable resources to rescue the bourgeoisie 
shaken by the crisis, and in the next phase – that is, in the present days – they are 
making efforts to stop up the gaps thus created by tapping into welfare budgets, 
first of all in Europe, while the “people” address their complaints to the “good 
kings” (the national governments), not to the bourgeoisie.
In sum: both workers and capitalists – and consequently, their relations – are 
disappearing from view; what is fairly visible in their place are lord-servant, 
king-subject relationships; that is, a feudal network of relations.
As for the goal of production, in new capitalism the main aim of capitalists 
is still the maximization of profit, but these capitalists lay claim to powerful 
authority and a privileged position for themselves: they deploy all their weapons 
– mobilization of the media, sponsorship, etc. – to make society believe that they 
and the institutions they represent are endowed with special abilities that qualify 
them to determine the social behavioral norms that should be adopted; to define 
what is the “common good”.
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The dominant fraction of power in new capitalism is also the bourgeoisie, but 
the international economic and monetary superstructure displays traits typical of 
feudalism, since in addition to the global bourgeoisie it also includes the political 
and military elite of the United States and leaders of the great international 
monetary organizations and credit-rating agencies, as well as the global media, 
and among these agents there is a subtle and intricate network of formal and 
informal relations. This network of relations is regulated by the ethos, value 
system and behavioral norms of the actors interested in the protection of their 
global power. Thus, the international economic-monetary superstructure can be 
taken for a social estate displaying characteristics of class that is re-allocating 
international economic resources not only according to market but also power 
criteria. In the power positions of individual nation states one also finds strata 
with class characteristics, which are, however, most often subordinated to the 
superstructure on the basis of a peculiar alloy of market logic and feudalistic 
logic. 
The core of the dominant logic of new capitalism is the principle of utility 
measured in terms of money and profit, but in its mobilization the principle 
of utility measured by authority and power privileges also plays a role. The 
latter, first of all through the cooperation of the global superstructure and the 
national superstructures, may modify or restrict the free flow of the factors of 
production (in detail, see Szalai 2006). This process was especially marked in 
the period following the global crisis of 2008 in which the global superstructure 
and the national superstructures regulated the flux of the factors of production 
and subordinated them to the criteria of crisis management, meaning their 
own power stability. This tendency was reinforced by the fact that during the 
process of crisis management the role of national superstructures increased to 
the detriment of the global superstructure, and since this resulted in the greater 
fragmentation of the global power space, it also became more restrictive. This 
process now finds itself bumping up against the interests and aspirations of the 
global bureaucracy – as mirrored in the earlier planned and secretly elaborated 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership by which the global bourgeoisie 
wanted to get the better of nation states that still protected local markets to some 
extent. This was to have been precipitated by a planned new rule under which 
large multinational firms could have sued nation states in an international court 
about their grievances. The plan has failed for the time being, but it is a question 
when the international bourgeoisie will gather enough momentum to advance 
its global aims.
The practice of the free flow of production factors, including manpower, is 
forcing its way in the form of a backlash from the peripheries to the core of 
global economy; in other words, we are faced with the escalation of the great 
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challenge of our time, the migration process. Fundamentally, the acceleration 
of the migration process represents the flow of a low-income labor force toward 
the central areas that can provide them with a higher income. Proof of this is 
that the majority of migrants (over 60%) leave their countries for economic, not 
political reasons (Klubrádió, 22 January 2016, Európazóna); that is, the threat 
of war only explains a smaller portion of migration away from the peripheries 
on a mass scale.
Among the cultural causes of accelerating migration, capitalization and 
refeudalization are equally present. Owing to rapid and specific technological 
development facilitated by capitalist conditions, its achievements in 
telecommunications appear in the poorest shacks of the peripheries – thus the 
inhabitants of the peripheries are informed, on a live basis, of the consumption 
customs of the populace of core regions, and among the repelling and attractive 
factors they are apparently more influenced by the latter, particularly the young, 
more mobile generations.
In the longer run, accelerating migration might indeed bring about the 
equalization of work incomes in the center and the periphery and semi-
periphery; that is, the capitalist, market-governed character of capitalism 
might overcome new capitalism if the cultural tensions it has generated do 
not incur fierce resistance by the populations and governments of the center, 
although dramatic signs indicate that this is happening. It is quite possible 
that the center will respond with the firm closure of its borders and a halt 
on migration, followed by a new and sudden stop to the free flow of capital, 
resulting in rough inequalities that also take the form of political tensions. 
As the declared goals and first moves of Donald Trump, the newly elected 
president of the USA, prove, this process has already begun. That is, the 
tensions caused by the expansion and unfolding of capitalism is triggering off 
a new wave of refeudalization.
According to the ideology of capitalism, neo-capitalist societies are 
integrated by the market through the logic of capital, whereas in reality the 
market mechanism has disrupted and disintegrated societies since the turn 
towards neoliberalism, causing a degree of differentiation that jeopardizes the 
functioning of the system. The masses of redundant people who require only a 
solvent income, but whom nobody wants to exploit any longer are increasing, 
but the system is no longer able to cope with this situation according to 
its logic of functioning. As a result, the system is making way to a crisis of 
overproduction (Szalai 2006, 2012; Piketty 2015). That is what triggered off the 
global economic-monetary crisis of 2008, which is still being only superficially 
remedied (Farkas 2013, 2015).
--
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To conclude: strong forces are acting in new capitalism to get rid of the 
strengthening traits of feudalism, but in part precisely because of the wildings of 
this struggle ever newer waves of refeudalization are prevailing, and the system 
is shackled. Yet it remains capitalist, with increasingly feudal characteristics.
FEUDAL TRAITS AND SEMI-FEUDALISM  
IN HUNGARY
Although feudalistic traits were present as early as during nineteenth-century 
Hungarian capitalism, I now only go back in history to the interwar period. I 
define the Horthy regime as a semi-feudal social-economic system mainly on 
the basis of the work of István Bibó, Ferenc Erdei, Sándor Márai, Iván Berend 
T., and György Ránki. The economic basis was comprised of the large feudal 
estates and the development of a weak industry solely propelled by a war-time 
economy, while the predominant relations were master-servant relations and 
nepotistic connections which determined the poor integrative mechanisms of 
society. Upon the dual (partly feudal and partly capitalist) social-economic 
structure described by Erdei, an essentially authoritarian political regime was 
built in which the multi-party system was only formally present.
With the transformation of the political-economic system in 1945-1948 that 
introduced socialism as it existed, the lord-servant relationship faded, but was 
not replaced by neutral relations between the controller and the controlled, but 
by a relationship between the ruling stratum of the party and the one-party 
state as the collective proprietors of the productive tools, and the exploited wage 
laborers. This was, however, not a perfect relation of super- and sub-ordination; 
we know chiefly from Eszter Bartha’s work (2009) that the ruling regime paid 
its distinguished attention to all aspects of the living conditions of workers, 
first of all, industrial labor until the early 1980s (the latter individuals enjoying 
privileges during redistribution). (One reason why the center reversed the 
economic reform launched in 1968 was the fact that the partial liberalization of 
market relations detrimentally affected the income positions of workers of large-
scale industries – Szalai 1981, 1989a). In Hungary during the advanced stage of 
existing socialism the workers functioned as a class, their position owing partly 
to the revolution of 1956 and partly to the ideological conviction and devotion of 
some of the members of the ruling regime in key positions. However, in contrast 
to the dominant ideology of the political system, the former cannot be regarded 
as the ruling class, for power was concentrated in the hands of the party and the 
one-party state, a conglomerate with certain class features, yet fundamentally 
feudal in character.
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Thus, the dominant relations were simultaneously feudal (workers and 
industrial laborers predominantly received allowances through the grace of the 
leadership), capitalist (the working force rendered wage labor) and socialistic. 
Actually, this combination indeed created a third way, or middle-of-the-road 
approach (in detail, see Szalai 2014).
A similar logic is applicable to the survival of nepotistic relations. Although 
the system of rational redistribution (Konrád and Szelényi 1989) is capitalistic 
and socialistic at the same time – it is characterized by efficiency measured in 
money, profit and the satisfaction of social needs alike – both macro and micro 
relations are permeated by feudalistic favoritism; i.e., relations that primarily 
rely on and aim at enhancing authority and power; without this “lubrication,” 
the system would grind to a halt.
A strongly feudalistic feature of the system was the informal assertion of 
interests permeating every relation, and sly servility mixed with veiled scorn 
for authority. The essence of these two features is to create the illusion that 
individuals are adapting and obeying, while attempts are continually made to 
dupe the superior authority or authorities.
The holders of the peak power of the regime included the ruling stratum 
(top party leadership), the technocracy (expert officials of the one-party state) 
and managers of large factories in a monopoly position. The ruling order was 
thus feudalistic (the stratum is sustained by a network of formal and informal, 
predominantly individual bargains and was sanctioned by the common ethos 
and behavioral pattern), capitalistic (the performance of large companies and 
their leaders was evaluated, though within considerable limits, by the market), 
and socialistic (the ruling regime governs a latently pluralist system) (as 
Elemér Hankiss [1983] put it) from the mid-1960s onwards. This means that it 
considered the partial interests of society, first of all of industrial factory labor, 
in its decisions. The ruling regime of existing socialism was thus essentially a 
middle-of-the-road construction, feudalist traits being vital components.
It is neither the socialistic system of plans and indicators nor the capitalistic 
mechanism of the market that ensured social integration, but the administrative 
market, a peculiar alloy of the two with feudalistic traits: the administrative 
market was a system of institutionalized expectations and disciplining which 
contained and conveyed elements of both political and economic efficiency (the 
latter measured in terms of profit). Deals on the administrative market often 
involved political effectiveness (connected partly to the self-interest of the 
powers and partly to the interests of industrial workers) and economic efficiency 
measured in profitability (in detail, see Szalai 2014).
The dominant ideology of the regime from the mid-1960s could not be 
identified by its Marxist-Leninist character, but by the attitude of the slogan 
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“who is not against us is with us”. This “ideology” was embodied in the 
toleration, sometimes even stimulation, of the second economy that both 
resembled feudalistic vassalage relations and the relations of a capitalist small 
economy.
In sum: the existing socialism in Hungary was basically a middle-of-the-road 
formation with strong feudalistic traits.
These feudalistic features did not disappear with the change of the system and 
the building of the Hungarian variant of new capitalism, but kept reemerging, 
so that by now social relations have assumed a semi-feudal character strongly 
reminiscent of the interwar period.
In the world, bourgeois revolutions leading to capitalism were always 
preceded and prepared for by the emergence and strengthening of propertied 
urban middle classes/bourgeoisie. Before and during the Eastern European 
“capitalist turn” of 1989/90, a different scenario was acted out: in the course of 
existing socialism no propertied bourgeoisie could emerge which was strong 
enough to prepare and initiate system change. In Hungary, this role was played 
first of all by the late Kádárian technocracy (that I have often discussed) that 
was born within power structure and articulated the interests of the still non-
existing but prospected propertied bourgeoisie, and second, by the democratic 
opposition outside the hierarchy of power but formulating the ideology of the 
former, as well as by the new reform-minded intellectuals hovering between 
the two “forms of existence” (Szalai 1994). From this cast of roles, it logically 
follows that the change of system was initiated and carried out from above, 
hence it had a feudalistic character: the appearance and strengthening of the 
propertied bourgeoisie could not be the outcome of a spontaneous process, but 
this bourgeoisie was appointed in the course of the system change by the late 
Kádárian technocracy to key positions in the state bureaucracy. The instruments 
of the process were the decomposition of so-called state-owned property and its 
distribution among political clients, as well as the luring of foreign large capital. 
In other words: a proprietary-economic structure functioning on the basis of 
capitalist logic as conceived at the top was to be created along a fundamentally 
feudal logic.
The new proprietary structure that had more or less stabilized by the early 
2000s was characterized by the strong dominance of foreign capital (Szalai 
2001) for two main reasons. On the one hand, very little money had accumulated 
within for the purchase of so-called state property – this is why foreign capital 
was able to pick up the most valuable productive goods and buy up domestic 
rivals in the acquisition of the market. On the other hand, the extremely fast 
process of privatization compared to other East European countries, and even 
more, the related involvement of extra-large foreign capital, can be attributed 
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to the neoliberal ideological conviction of the late Kádárian technocracy that 
governed the process. What is more, this thinking meant that the first factor 
described above – the lack of domestic solvency – turned into such an influential 
factor. (In the other East European countries in which the system was changed, 
privatization was far slower, more organic and considerate of social justice. 
The explanation in part is that in these existing socialisms the stronger central 
power and harsher suppression did not allow, or only allowed sporadically, the 
emergence within the ranges of power of a young western-type, market-oriented 
technocracy that later adopted an openly neoliberal economic philosophy whose 
views later petrified into social dogmas. This was how the earlier Hungarian 
advantage turned later into a disadvantage.) The fast and inorganic process of 
privatization in Hungary resulted in a dual social and economic structure typical 
of the semi-peripheries of capitalism and reminiscent of the interwar period: a 
capitalist world governed by fairly transparent, calculable rules in the sphere of 
settled multinational companies, and in the sphere of feeble domestic capital a 
feudal-semi-feudal world regulated by feudalistic norms – or more precisely, 
by deregulation as the rule (Szalai 2001). Compared to earlier conditions, the 
unrestrained advance of the capitalist logic strengthened the feudal features of 
power and society.
The comparatively well-regulated multinational sector adapts to this feudalistic 
logic when it is in its interests. And, naturally enough, its interests are shared at 
many points with the domestic bourgeoisie: it is in their common interest that 
the greater part of legal rules regulating the activity of this economic elite should 
be formulated by them, and also, in the most frenzied period of privatization the 
application of the rules of competition should be shelved by the political elite for 
an indefinite time (Szalai 2001). It is thus in their common interest – at least in 
the short run – to have the economic elite dominate politics, but paradoxically 
the predominance of the bourgeoisie reinforced the feudalistic, not only the 
capitalist features of the system.
It is also in their common interest to smash the trade unions and make labor 
defenselessness. As a consequence, it is in Hungary alone where, owing to 
soaring capital income or profit, income from work does not cover the costs 
of the reproduction of a broad strata of manpower, a typical feature of new 
capitalism (Szalai 2001, 2012).
These costs would imply that resources are being drained continuously from 
the spheres of collective consumption – education, health care and cultural goods 
– and according to the logic of the system this cannot be otherwise: from the 
early 1990s until 1996-97 production and hence central revenues plummeted, 
not to speak of the fact that the neoliberal ideology of the system also involved 
the strong moderation of collective consumption. Succinctly formulated: “… it 
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is everyone’s duty to care for themselves, and those who are incapable of doing 
so can only blame themselves, for instead of enterprising, working, they want 
to sponge off others.” It is according to this logic that returns from privatization 
are not spent on innovation that creates new jobs or stops up the huge gaps 
in collective consumption but, in harmony with the short-term interests of the 
political elite, they are used to decrease state indebtedness (Szalai 2001, 2012, 
Böröcz 2015). In short: the bourgeoisie and the political elite are devouring the 
future of the country by dangerously degrading “human resources”.
Workers are not protected by free contracts or legal rules – and this is naturally 
attractive to the interests of incoming foreign capital, let alone the domestic 
bourgeoisie. Since labor is perfectly defenseless, the capitalist capital-versus-
labor relationship is transforming into a feudalistic, paternalist-lord-versus-
servant relationship. 
In addition to the curbing of collective consumption, the other basic feature 
of central redistribution by the dominant socialist-liberal governments in power 
until 2010 was their reliance on feudalistic individual bargaining mechanisms 
instead of normative regulation, since this mechanism also relatively favored 
foreign capital over the domestic bourgeoisie (Szalai 2001, 2012). The latter 
were therefore increasingly hostile to central preferences and the increasing 
advance of foreign capital from about the early 2000s, and from then on used 
their resources and political weight to support Fidesz–KDNP who called for the 
elevation of the Hungarian bourgeoisie. Moreover, anticipating as it were the 
anti-poor policies of Fidesz and fed up with the allegedly burdensome levels of 
tax levied on capital, they started openly to demand the powerful roll-back of 
collective consumption (Szalai 2012, 2014).
Overt support from the big bourgeoisie and the informal-financial backing of 
the party largely contributed to the election victory of Fidesz in 2010. However, 
Fidesz’s victory has far deeper social and social psychological causes. The pre-
2010 phase of Hungarian new capitalism was interlaced with feudal elements 
but from the viewpoint of the liberties of the bourgeoisie a laissez-faire period 
involving the accumulation of social tensions of extraordinary magnitude and 
special nature that turned the system inside out, and prepared the ground for 
the birth and consolidation of an authoritarian political elite that was to come to 
subordinate the economic elite. On the one hand, a wide swathe of social strata 
went down in the world, losing their footing (Szalai 2001, 2012, 2014) and – 
driven by elementary instincts – turned towards a political force that promised 
to halt further backsliding and offered some props or clues about how to increase 
security. On the other hand, the broad social strata of dropouts experienced an 
identity crisis as the old communities and the identities built on them crumbled 
into dust, and no new ones evolved due to the narrow array of available roles, 
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while this new political force promised the a new community a new identity and 
new self-esteem: “around us everything is on the brink of collapse, but we hold 
firmly to our ground because we are tied together by being Hungarians.”
The strengthening of political and economic peak power was also implied 
by the global crisis that started in 2008, massively reinforcing earlier signs 
of domestic crisis appearing in Hungarian society and economy: on the one 
hand, the surfacing of the inherent tensions in the malformed, inorganic, dual 
economic-social structure (such as when the dominant German market for 
exports almost exclusively produced in the assembly halls of the multinational 
sector shrank), and on the other, the lack of real innovation and the reproduction 
of human resources lead to a halt in GDP growth after 2004. This was worsened 
by the nearly complete collapse of foreign markets and the splintering of the 
domestic financial institutional system, a situation whose handling cried out for 
firm powerful central intervention.
From the beginning of the regime to the present days, the main aim of Fidesz 
after the party assumed power in 2010 was to regulate the earlier dominant 
bourgeoisie. One tool for this was the creation of a bourgeois clientele loyal 
to it, a move that was only possible through the radical reshuffling of capital 
and income, which, in turn, logically implies ignoring constitutional frames 
and considerably weakening democratic checks and balances. The other tool 
involves playing off both the Hungarian and the current international capitals – 
putting them in competition with one another (examples of the former practice 
are widely found in public procurement procedures, and now in the privatization 
of state land, the latter practice exemplified by favoring specific – and excluding 
certain other – multinational companies in the system of strategic agreements.)
The other important goal of Fidesz is to further depress the cost of manpower 
and to render the labor market “flexible”, one important instrument of which is 
the modification of the labor code to the detriment of employees. This favors the 
bourgeoisie, on the one hand. On the other, but related to the former objective, 
is the dilemma whether international competitiveness should be promoted by 
improving human resources so they are capable of creating significant additional 
value, or conversely, rendering manpower cheaper and more flexible: like its 
predecessors, Fidesz also voted for the latter strategy until 2017. The intention 
to further tap human resources is implied by the extraction of resources from 
education, health and culture, which is in line with the policy of the socialist-
liberal governments, but now more emphatically practiced.
In response to the massive exodus of predominantly young manpower and the 
nearly fatal weakening of human resources, in 2017 Fidesz undertook a turn away 
from the above outlined policy by considerably increasing the minimum wage 
and guaranteed minimum income. The question is how long the bourgeoisie 
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will put up with this, and whether it will turn its “own” bourgeoisie against it.
The third main goal of the current regime is to re-educate citizens and place 
them under the party’s sway. There are several instruments for doing this; first 
of all, the communal work program, but also the centralization of the resources 
of culture and science, and the ambition to manually control these spheres, as 
well as attacks on civil society. While the predominant slogan, clamorously 
promoted, is: “the country is at one”, György Bánki (2015: 1) termed the regime 
‘the System of Narcissistic Cooperation’: “The priority is the enrichment and 
glory of the elite, while the community must believe that decisions are in their 
service.”
--
Let us provide a recap of the period using the definitions proposed in the 
introductory chapter.
The dawn of new capitalism in Hungary is dominated by lord-vs.-servant 
relations, instead of a capital-vs.-labor arrangement: the situation of the working 
strata existing in the previous system has collapsed as a result of the activity not 
of the then-inchoate bourgeoisie, but of its progenitor with strong feudalistic 
traits, the late-Kádárian technocracy whose activity brought about almost total 
economic collapse and entailed the laying off of masses of workers and legal 
deprivation. In this process, no props or protection were provided for workers 
(Szalai 2001). In existing socialism the workforce was not the owner of social 
property, but they were not so “excessively” deprived of it, nor so excessively at 
the mercy of their “superiors” as after 1989.
With the birth of the bourgeoisie, elements of the capital-labor relationship 
also appeared but with the characteristics discussed in the section of this paper 
about the similar relations of global new capitalism: for the listed reasons 
(capitalists hiding behind the state, labor in disarray, eradication of the self-
esteem of workers) the capital-vs.-labor relation is very poorly articulated. 
The swollen reserve of unemployed place the workforce into such a helpless 
situation – particularly in the sphere of domestic proprietors, because in the 
multinational sector the position of labor is somewhat more favorable due to the 
partial application of the rights won by workers in the West – that the situation 
of the “good or bad” king who represents the state, and the unstable, lawless 
subjects becomes visible (Szalai 2001, 2011, 2012, Bartha 2009).
With the victory of Fidesz in 2010, the outlined situation has acquired 
even more sharply chiseled features. Though the rhetoric of the ruling 
party says “we have to restore the honor of physical work”, the mentioned 
modification of the labor code further debases the living circumstances and 
bargaining position of workers, strengthening their status as subjects. One 
palpable example is the system of communal work that functions as forced 
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labor. Due to the earlier-begun and continuous depletion of human resources 
and the degradation of vocational training, productivity is not increasing 
in the entrepreneurial sphere, jeopardizing the profit expectations of the 
bourgeoisie. Labor shortages are most pressing in jobs that require higher-
level qualifications. Capitalists respond to the situation by announcing their 
demand (through the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the first place) 
and effectively lobbying for the government to subordinate secondary and 
tertiary education to their immediate and emphatically short-term interests. 
(A corollary is that the government lowered the school-leaving age from 18 to 
16 years, which move actually runs counter to the aim of making labor adapt 
more flexibly to the long-term manpower needs of the bourgeoisie.) All this 
reinforces the feudalistic traits of the bourgeoisie-government relationship, as 
well as the connection between this conglomerate and the future workforce 
and other employees, for it hinders the free choice of careers and the training 
of diverse skills which alone might guarantee at least a minimal bargaining 
position for workers and other employees. The response to this situation is the 
mentioned emigration, on a mass scale…
Around the time of the political turn, the structure of power was strongly 
feudalistic. Power was concentrated in the hands of a feudalistic “estate” whose 
dominant fraction comprised the late Kádárian technocracy. Its subfractions 
included the feudalistically stratified new political elite, the earlier opposition 
intellectuals who formulated the ideology of the system change, and the pliant, now 
strengthening, now weakening group of large company leaders of an uncertain 
position; rivals for proprietary rights with the late-Kádárian technocracy. The 
socialistic traits of the ruling regime of the previous system disappeared, even 
reversed, without capitalist characteristics gaining predominance.
In the period of socialist-liberal governments – after the great turn, and 
later – the emerging big bourgeoisie, including primarily the managers of 
multinational large companies, constituted the dominant fraction of the ruling 
elite. Its subfractions included the feudalistically structured political elites and 
the cultural elite. Incorporated in the state bureaucracy and the cultural elite, 
and less importantly in the business sphere, the late Kádárian technocracy still 
preserved its leading role, but now it meant the articulation and representation of 
the emerging and later the established bourgeoisie, particularly its multinational 
sector, instead of the assertion of some independent “line”.
In the time interval under study, that ruling regime was the most capitalistic 
power formation  and displayed class features owing to the dominance of the 
bourgeoisie, but predominantly because of the feudalistic functioning of the 
bourgeoisie (or its feudalistic characteristics), the feudal traits of power also 
remained.
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After Fidesz’ rise to power in 2010, as mentioned earlier, the victorious 
political elite tried to subdue the economic elite during the power struggle, first 
of all by creating a loyal bourgeoisie and by pitting the large capitalists in both 
the Hungarian and the multinational sections against one another, as well as 
evoking competition between sectors. Not independently of the weakening or 
elimination of checks and balances, the opposition parties have now become 
quite weightless. The rightist technocracy and the majority of intellectuals 
have become vassals of the ruling parties, the aim of the latter being the servile 
formulation of the ideology of the new political order and the exclusion of 
“left-liberal” intellectuals from the cultural elite, together with the blocking of 
leftist critical intellectuals (Szalai 2016). However narrowed, the forums of the 
“left-liberal” intellectuals still survive, and its actors include some prominent 
representatives of the late Kádárian technocracy who have gradually been 
ousted from diverse power spheres, also for reasons of age.
It was not independent of the playing off of diverse top capitalists against 
each other that some of them began to oppose the ruling elite from around 2014-
15, but the outcome of this confrontation cannot be predicted yet. Since the 
leading figure of the “oppositional” grand bourgeoisie, Lajos Simicska, owns a 
considerable media empire, the maneuvering possibilities of intellectuals in the 
right-wing media have somewhat expanded.
From around the same time, cracks appeared in the ruling party and technocracy, 
connected to two factors. For one thing, since the forces of opposition have 
been wiped out nearly completely, all the inner tensions and contradictions of 
the system are articulated within the ruling party and technocracy. Also, and 
consequently, pitting large capitalists against each other cerates real rivalries, 
which also divide the ruling party and technocracy.
The feudal traits of the ruling regime have strengthened since 2010, while its 
class features have weakened, but owing to the declining but still retained power 
position of the large bourgeoisie and the overt or covert resistance of a part of 
it, we cannot speak of a full feudal turn of the ruling regime, only a semi-feudal 
turn.
As regards the integrative mechanisms of Hungarian new capitalism, such 
mechanisms – as mentioned earlier – are almost non-existent; what is more, 
disintegrative mechanisms are preponderant (Szalai 2001; Utasi 2008; Szalai 
2011, 2016). Sporadic signs of this process can be discerned from the early 1980s 
onwards, while they gathered momentum with the great political and economic 
turn. The feudalistic logic of new capitalism (efficiency measured by authority 
and power privileges) and its mechanisms, as well as the market mechanism 
centered on profit maximization fuel this tendency by reinforcing one another: 
the feudalistic central interventions intensify the inequalities – it is these that 
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they usually intensify – to which the market responds, and which it reinforces. 
The alloy of the two mechanisms creates the administrative market of new 
capitalism.
The basis is the mentioned dual structure of economy and society and the 
growing gap between the two spheres. (It must be added that the two spheres, 
first of all the multinational sector, are not integrated internally [Szalai 2012]). 
The other basis is the tendency to an increase in the income gap and general 
inequalities. (For a most suggestive account, see Ákos Huszár [Dercsényi 2015]).
According to Tárki reports, inequalities in income distribution were only 
slightly alleviated in 2003-2007 and after 2012 (Szívós and Tóth 2014). The 
decrease in 2003-2007 is attributable to the welfare turn initiated by Prime 
Minister Péter Medgyessy in the course of which civil servants’ wages and 
social benefits were massively raised. The decrease after 2012 was primarily 
caused by the extensive broadening of communal work.
There are, however, justifiable doubts about the reliability of data, because with 
the increase in income inequalities incomes at the upper- and lowermost levels 
of society are hardly, if at all, measurable. (Both the very rich and the very poor 
are unreachable for surveying.) Nonetheless, if the data do contain elements of 
truth, then these two intermezzi can be ascribed to the feudalistic intervention 
of the central power in the teeth of spontaneous market mechanisms.
The dominant ideology of the system during the social liberal periods (except 
for the brief episode under Medgyessy) highlighted the placing of capitalism on 
a pedestal. One element of the ideology was touched on earlier: “… everyone 
has the duty to care for themselves, and those who can’t should find fault with 
themselves.” The exception is the Roma population. The other element is the 
tenet that, since capitalism basically works well, the “middle class” need no 
attention, they can get along by themselves, state help is only due to the poorest.
The norm of “self-reliance as everybody’s duty” becomes even more central 
to the ideology of the Fidesz governments than it ever was during the social 
liberal period: it practically contains no tolerance or understanding for the poor 
or any of their strata. While the social liberal ideology of neoliberal inspiration 
regarded the growth of inequalities as the automatic, unavoidable and regrettable 
concomitant of the market economy, the Fidesz governments deliberately 
promote with their feudalistic tools the massively above-average enrichment of 
the upper middle class – who owe them gratitude and loyalty for this – and the 
utter deprivation of the poorest: the core of their dominant ideology is that those 
“who carry the country on their backs” must be backed up by central support. 
Related is an element of one of their main legitimating ideas which says that 
the time of the welfare societies is finally over; now a society of work has to be 
constructed in which there is no “free lunch”.
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
A review of global and Hungarian processes leads to the conclusion that the 
processes of refeudalization are immanent characteristics of new capitalism. 
They appear, paradoxically, as the wild excesses of unbridled capitalism (e.g. 
global mega-monopolies take nation states captive, thus constraining the 
freedom of market competition) on the one hand, and – speaking in Károly 
Polányi’s terms – as protection against the wild excesses of capitalism (e.g. 
the nation states’ response to the 2008 global crisis, and in Hungary, as an 
authoritarian reaction to the general loss of security resulting from the earlier 
laissez-faire period).
But why is the world, and Hungary, proceeding towards feudalism – a 
seemingly antiquated formation –; i.e., backwards, instead of escaping forward 
into a socialist model, to avoid the anomalies of capitalism? Short answer: the 
social foundations and conditions for moving toward a socialist alternative are 
extremely weak, owing particularly to the mental state of societies, and this 
weakness is also manifest in the great amount of uncertainty present in socialist 
ideologies (see in detail, Szalai 2006).
--
Widening the horizon, one can infer from Hungarian processes that 
refeudalizing tendencies appear when the semi-peripheral “system” laid bare to 
global processes faces a strong external challenge, in addition to internal causes. 
This challenge is a radical change in the geopolitical, geo-economic balance, 
eliciting the feudalistic, authoritarian endeavors of power as a defense.
In the reviewed period it is first around the time of the change of the political 
system in 1989 that such a shift can be discerned – that was when the so-far 
bipolar world system changed into a unipolar system. The second response 
began to be felt around 2010 when the earlier unipolar global system started 
shifting in a multipolar direction, first of all owing to Russian power ambitions: 
now leaders at the summit of power have to accommodate themselves to several 
– at least two – forces, which urges the concentration of power. (However, the 
new situation also implies some maneuvering possibility for the peak power.)
While around 1989 only feudalistic features strengthened, around 2010 what 
occurred was a turn towards semi-feudalism: this is indicated first by the measures 
of the peak political elite that featured feudal lords bridling a bourgeoisie regarded 
as vassals; second, by rendering the earlier also rather weak political opposition 
perfectly weightless through the undermining of the system of checks and 
balances; and third, by degrading the workforce to a state of servitude.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that in Hungary there never was a capitalist 
or socialist “state” close to the ideal type compared to which the strengthening 
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of feudalistic features or a semi-feudal turn may be discussed. Much rather, 
the country moved from a society with weaker feudalistic traits toward a more 
strongly feudalistic society – and back. An undulating motion can be traced: 
predominantly in the last decade of existing socialist the spontaneous movements 
of society and hence capitalistic features strengthened, while in the period of 
the major change of a strongly centralized, etatist character feudalistic traits 
became stronger in connection with the weakening of spontaneous processes. 
Then the consolidation of the change of the economic system resulting in 
bourgeois dominance entailed the strengthening of capitalistic characteristics, 
while the tensions it generated led to the repeated reinforcement of feudalistic 
traits and even to a semi-feudal turn. This domestic undulation is catalyzed by 
external challenges.
In 1989 I prognosticated (Szalai 1989b) that the feudalistic character of our 
social system would survive in the long run, but clad in West European clothes. 
It would incorporate all the elements of modern commodity and monetary 
economy, but the fundamental relations they conceal would largely remain 
feudalistic. This prognosis has been verified as valid.
Now I predict that the semi-feudal regime in Hungary will hold sway for a 
long time – this tendency is being reinforced by the tempestuous changes in 
the world and in the European Union that promote the call for national isolation 
and the strengthening of authoritarian national power centers as a defensive 
response, at least in the short and medium term. If there is no socialist turn, 
global capital (as discussed earlier) will sooner or later perfectly (or almost 
perfectly) deconstruct the national frame, preparing a new capitalistic turn.
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